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CRIMINAL LAW 
REFORMING THE LAW ON SHOW-UP 
IDENTIFICATIONS 
MICHAEL D. CICCHINI* & JOSEPH G. EASTON∗∗ 
 
When a crime has been committed, law enforcement will often ask the 
crime victim to identify the perpetrator in a lineup, photo array, or show-
up.  A show-up is an identification procedure in which, unlike in a lineup or 
photo array, the suspect is presented singly to the crime victim.  Based on a 
positive identification, the prosecutor will then prosecute, and often convict, 
the defendant. 
Research has shown, however, that eyewitness identification evidence 
is incredibly unreliable and is by far the leading cause of wrongful 
convictions.  Further, show-ups are the least reliable of all the 
identification procedures, and their use further increases the incidence of 
wrongful convictions.  Despite this serious problem, the majority of states 
follow the Supreme Court’s framework for determining whether show-up 
evidence is admissible at trial.  This majority approach, or majority rule, 
employs a malleable and outdated facts-and-circumstances analysis.  As a 
result, unreliable show-up evidence is routinely used against defendants in 
criminal trials. 
Some states, however, have decided to offer defendants meaningful 
protection under their individual state constitutions.  One type of reform is 
best described as an evolution of the majority approach, in which 
additional relevant factors have been added to the facts-and-circumstances 
analysis.  A second type of reform is best described as a revolution against 
the majority approach, in which show-up identification evidence is 
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Board of Examiners (1997); M.B.A., Marquette University Graduate School (1994); B.S., 
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∗∗ J.D., California Western School of Law (2004); B.A., University of Wisconsin-
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generally prohibited unless at the time of the show-up: (1) exigent 
circumstances prevented the use of a lineup or photo array; or (2) the 
police lacked probable cause to arrest the suspect and, therefore, could not 
have legally detained him long enough to conduct a lineup or photo array. 
This revolutionary approach to show-up reform, also known as the 
minority approach or the minority rule, offers innocent defendants genuine 
protection against false identifications and wrongful convictions and, 
therefore, should be adopted by the Supreme Court.  However, despite these 
increased protections, trial courts that wish to admit show-up evidence 
have been able to thwart the minority rule by distorting its two 
exceptions⎯the exigent circumstances exception and the probable cause 
exception.  This Article will expose and explain these judicial abuses and 
will recommend further modifications to the minority rule in order to 
eliminate judicial abuse and better protect defendants’ due process rights 
as originally intended. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When false eyewitness identifications and wrongful convictions are 
discovered, they are usually exposed through postconviction DNA testing.1  
However, in the vast majority of criminal cases, DNA evidence has either 
been destroyed2 or, more commonly, never even existed in the first place.3  
This, of course, poses a significant problem for the innocent defendant 
convicted based primarily on eyewitness evidence.  To illustrate this, 
 
1 See, e.g., Suzannah B. Gambell, Comment, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers 
Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189 (2006) 
(discussing State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999), in which the defendant was falsely 
identified, wrongly convicted, sentenced to sixty years of incarceration, and then exonerated 
six years later); Jessica Lee, Note, No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent Suspects 
from the Consequences of Non-Exigent Show-Ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 755 (2005) 
(discussing Gregory v. State, No. 93-SC-878-MR (Ky. Nov. 23, 1993), in which the 
defendant was falsely identified, wrongfully convicted, sentenced to seventy years of 
incarceration, and then exonerated seven years later); Ruth Yacona, Comment, Manson v. 
Brathwaite: The Supreme Court’s Misunderstanding of Eyewitness Identification, 39 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 539 (2006) (discussing State v. Cotton, 394 S.E.2d 456 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1990), in which the defendant was falsely identified, wrongly convicted, sentenced to life 
imprisonment, and then exonerated eleven years later). 
2 See Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted: Judicial Sanctions 
for Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893 (2009) (discussing how poor 
handling of evidence has resulted in premature destruction in thousands of cases, including 
in states in which laws have been enacted mandating evidence preservation). 
3 See Barry Scheck, Closing Remarks to Symposium, Thinking Outside the Box: 
Proposals for Change, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 899 (2002) (discussing how only a minority of 
serious felony cases involve biological evidence). 
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consider the following hypothetical example, to which we will refer 
periodically throughout this Article. 
A crime victim calls 9-1-1 to report a robbery at his apartment.  The perpetrator is a 
white male of medium height who was wearing a black jacket.  The man brandished a 
gun, demanded that the victim turn over his wallet, and then fled the scene.  Police 
respond immediately, and while en route, one officer sees a white male of medium 
height, wearing a black jacket, standing on a street corner about two blocks from the 
crime scene. 
The man sees the officer and immediately turns and attempts to walk away.  Based on 
the man’s proximity to the crime scene, his general appearance, and his behavior, the 
officer stops him and conducts a pat-down search.  When doing so, he finds a folding 
utility knife in the man’s pocket; no gun or stolen wallet is found.  The officer arrests 
the man for carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor, and places him in his squad 
car. 
No other suspects are found in the immediate area, so one of the on-scene officers 
radios the arresting officer and instructs him to hold the man for a show-up procedure, 
in which he will be presented singly to the crime victim for identification.  The 
arresting officer then removes the man, now the suspect, from the squad car.  The 
suspect is surrounded by three officers, two of whom have just arrived to assist.  Two 
other officers take the crime victim in another squad car and drive slowly past the 
suspect. 
The victim sees the suspect handcuffed, standing near a squad car, and surrounded by 
three uniformed police officers.  An officer asks the victim whether he can identify 
the suspect as the perpetrator.  Despite having seen the perpetrator for only a few 
seconds while under a great deal of stress and despite not being able to describe the 
perpetrator with any amount of detail, the victim is convinced that the police arrested 
the right man.  As a result of the show-up procedure, he positively identifies the 
suspect as the perpetrator.  The suspect, having already been arrested for carrying the 
folding utility knife, is taken to the county jail for booking. 
After reviewing the case, the prosecutor decides to charge the suspect, now the 
defendant, with armed robbery.  The defendant denies the allegation and demands a 
trial.  The prosecutor has no evidence other than the show-up identification procedure, 
which the defendant moves to suppress on due process grounds.  The prosecutor 
argues that the show-up was constitutionally proper and, therefore, is admissible at the 
defendant’s trial. 
This hypothetical example—subtle variations of which play out on a 
daily basis in criminal courts throughout our country—raises a number of 
issues.  As a preliminary matter, is the victim’s positive identification of the 
suspect really reliable?  Part II of this Article briefly discusses how 
eyewitness identification evidence, even when obtained under the best of 
circumstances, is hopelessly unreliable and is the leading cause of wrongful 
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convictions in our country.4  Part III then briefly explains how the use of a 
show-up procedure, such as the one employed in the robbery example 
above, greatly exacerbates the problem and makes already unreliable 
evidence even less reliable.5 
This background information then leads us to other issues that lie at 
the heart of this Article.  First and foremost, given that show-up procedures 
are highly unreliable, is show-up evidence nonetheless admissible at trial?  
Part IV.A discusses the Supreme Court’s framework for determining 
whether show-ups are admissible.  This framework, which has been 
adopted by most states and is known as the majority approach or the 
majority rule, employs a malleable and outdated facts-and-circumstances 
analysis and permits nearly unrestricted use of show-ups at trial.  
Consequently, it offers virtually no due process protection against highly 
unreliable, yet persuasive, show-up evidence.6 
Some states, however, have recognized this problem and now offer 
greater protection under their own state constitutions.  Part IV.B discusses 
the evolutionary approach to reform, which essentially modernizes and 
updates the majority rule’s facts-and-circumstances approach.7  Part IV.C 
then discusses the revolutionary approach to reform, which essentially 
rejects the majority rule’s facts-and-circumstances framework.  Instead, the 
revolutionary approach begins with the general rule that show-up evidence 
is not admissible unless at the time of the show-up: (1) exigent 
circumstances prevented the use of a less suggestive procedure, such as a 
lineup or photo array; or (2) the police lacked probable cause to arrest the 
defendant and, therefore, could not have legally detained him long enough 
to conduct a lineup or photo array.8 
Part IV.C further explains why this revolutionary approach⎯also 
known as the minority approach or the minority rule⎯is the superior model 
 
4 See infra Part II. 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 See infra Part IV.A. 
7 See infra Part IV.B. 
8 See infra Part IV.C.  This phrasing of the revolutionary approach to reform is based on 
State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005), which holds that show-ups will only be 
admissible at trial if they were “necessary,” and they will be found to be “necessary” only if 
“the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest or, as a result of other exigent 
circumstances, could not have conducted a lineup or photo array.”  Id. at 584-85.  Other 
cases that have adopted this approach have phrased the same substantive test slightly 
differently.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257 (Mass. 1995) (requiring 
a finding of exigent circumstances in order to justify a show-up procedure); State v. Adams, 
423 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1981) (requiring a finding of necessity in order to justify a 
show-up procedure). 
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for reform and should, therefore, be adopted by the Supreme Court.9  
However, despite the minority rule’s benefits, trial courts do not like the 
constraints that it places on law enforcement and have easily been able to 
thwart this would-be revolution in the law of show-up identifications.10 
More specifically, Part V.A illustrates how the courts have distorted 
the exigent circumstances exception to the minority rule.  If a court can 
somehow find that, at the time of the show-up, exigent circumstances 
prevented the use of a lineup or photo array, then the show-up will be 
admissible at trial.11  Similarly, Part V.B shows how courts have distorted 
the probable cause exception to the minority rule.  If a court can somehow 
find that, at the time of the show-up, the police did not have probable cause 
to arrest the defendant and, therefore, could not have conducted a time-
consuming lineup or photo array, then the show-up will, once again, be 
admissible at trial.12 
The ease with which courts are able to bypass the minority rule and its 
strengthened due process safeguards is alarming.  Part VI, therefore, 
proposes a solution that calls for further modification of the minority rule in 
order to protect against judicial abuses.  Only by constraining judicial 
discretion⎯especially with regard to the exigent circumstances and 
probable cause exceptions to the minority rule⎯will the underlying policy 
objectives of the revolutionary approach to reform be realized.13  Part VII 
then concludes the Article.14 
II. EYEWITNESSES AND MISIDENTIFICATIONS 
Erroneous eyewitness identifications have plagued our criminal justice 
system since its inception.  When DNA evidence became a prevalent tool 
for law enforcement in the 1980s, not only did it assist prosecutors in 
obtaining convictions, but it also reopened prior convictions that were 
obtained based primarily on eyewitness testimony.  Studies now reveal that 
erroneous eyewitness identifications “are the single greatest cause of 
wrongful convictions in the United States, and are responsible for more 
wrongful convictions than all other causes combined.”15  In fact, in 80% of 
the first one hundred postconviction DNA exonerations, the underlying 
 
9 See infra Part IV.C. 
10 See infra Part V. 
11 See infra Part V.A. 
12 See infra Part V.B. 
13 See infra Part VI. 
14 See infra Part VII. 
15 State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 592 (Wis. 2005) (citing Gary L. Wells et al., 
Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 605 (1998)). 
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wrongful convictions were based primarily, if not solely, on false 
identifications.16 
In these DNA exoneration cases, the DNA evidence proved to a 
scientific certainty that the defendant did not commit the crime charged and 
had been wrongfully convicted.  But even today, most innocent defendants 
do not have the luxury of DNA evidence to prove their innocence.  For 
example, in some cases the police do not collect or properly preserve the 
available DNA evidence.17  In most cases—including the hypothetical 
robbery discussed in Part I—DNA evidence simply does not exist.18  This 
leaves eyewitness identification evidence as the primary, if not sole, basis 
for a jury’s decision. 
Alarmingly, research shows “that approximately 40% of eyewitness 
identifications are mistaken.”19  Further, “[i]t is estimated there may be 
more than 10,000 people a year wrongfully convicted, most of whom were 
convicted as a result of mistaken identification.”20  This has led many in the 
criminal justice system to finally realize what others concluded long ago: 
eyewitness identification evidence is “hopelessly unreliable.”21  This 
unreliability, in turn, leads to a dual problem: not only is an innocent person 
 
16 See Yacona, supra note 1, at 556 (discussing JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 
(2000)); see also Calvin TerBeek, A Call for Precedential Heads: Why the Supreme Court’s 
Eyewitness Identification Jurisprudence is Anachronistic and Out-of-Step with Empirical 
Reality, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 21, 21-22 (2007) (discussing Gary L. Wells & Amy L. 
Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their 
Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360 (1998)). 
17 See, e.g., People v. Cress, 645 N.W.2d 669, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Cynthia E. 
Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological Evidence Under 
Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2005) (discussing how the 
“actual ‘management’ of evidence is, at best, inefficient and, at worst, nonexistent”) (citing 
Steve Berry, Disposal of DNA Leads to Review Policy: Rape Survivors and Police Rethink 
Limit for Keeping Evidence, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at B1; Tasgola Karla Bruner, 
Detective Accused of Destroying Rape Evidence, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 5, 2003, at 3H; 
Michael Perlstein, Evidence Missing at NOPD Storage; Items Lost, Destroyed in Cleaning of 
Room, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 4, 2003; Walt Philbin, N.O. Police Want Lee’s DNA to 
Investigate Local Killings, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 29, 2003, at 1). 
18 See Scheck, supra note 3, at 901 (discussing how only a minority of serious felony 
cases involve biological evidence that can be used for DNA testing). 
19 Amy Luria, Showup Identifications: A Comprehensive Overview of the Problems and 
a Discussion of Necessary Changes, 86 NEB. L. REV. 515, 516 (2008) (discussing Aldert 
Vrij, Psychological Factors in Eyewitness Testimony, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: 
TRUTHFULNESS ACCURACY AND CREDIBILITY 105, 106 (Amina Memon, Aldert Vrij & Ray 
Bull eds., 1998)). 
20 Gambell, supra note 1, at 190-91 (discussing ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. 
DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 4-1 (3d ed. 1997)). 
21 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995). 
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likely to be convicted, but the true perpetrator necessarily goes free, often to 
commit additional crimes.22 
Despite its hopeless unreliability, eyewitness identification evidence 
has proven to be an extremely powerful tool for the prosecution.  The 
reality is that jurors are “unduly receptive to identification evidence and are 
not sufficiently aware of its dangers.”23  Nothing is more convincing to 
jurors than a live witness who takes an oath and confidently proclaims that 
he saw the defendant commit the crime.24  In fact, the level of confidence 
exhibited by an eyewitness has been found to be the most powerful 
predictor of guilty verdicts.25  In other words, jurors equate confidence with 
reliability.  Social science research, however, has revealed yet another 
problem: a witness’s confidence in his identification has little, if any, 
correlation to the accuracy of his identification.26  In light of this, it 
becomes even more difficult for jurors to distinguish accurate 
identifications from inaccurate ones.27 
Even weak eyewitness testimony is incredibly powerful and, therefore, 
often leads to wrongful convictions.  Furthermore, cross-examination is not 
a particularly useful tool when the witness is simply mistaken, rather than 
outright lying.28  This phenomenon is best illustrated by a classic 
psychological study, in which three sets of mock jurors were presented with 
 
22 See Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the 
Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133 
(2008) (discussing the injustice of convicting the innocent and allowing the guilty suspect to 
continue to victimize the community); Michael H. Hoffheimer, Requiring Jury Instructions 
on Eyewitness Identification Evidence at Federal Criminal Trials, 80 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 585 (1989) (discussing the dual problem of allowing a dangerous suspect to 
go free while convicting an innocent person). 
23 Lee, supra note 1, at 772 (quoting Patrick M. Wall, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 19 (1965)). 
24 See TerBeek, supra note 16, at 21 (“[T]here is almost nothing more convincing than a 
live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says, ‘That’s the 
one!’” (quoting ELIZABETH LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979))). 
25 See Lee, supra note 1, at 772 (discussing multiple psychological studies linking an 
eyewitness’s confidence at trial to the likelihood of conviction). 
26 See id. at 773 (citing multiple psychological studies proving that “eyewitness 
confidence is not a reliable indicator of accuracy”). 
27 See TerBeek, supra note 16, at 26 (citing multiple psychological studies proving that 
jurors are unable to determine the accuracy of eyewitness testimony). 
28 See Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards 
a New Rule of Decision For Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 135 (2006) (“Finally, because the use of suggestive 
procedures and unreliable identifications almost always occur with eyewitnesses who 
honestly believe their own mistaken identifications, cross-examination is nearly useless.”). 
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identical evidence in a mock trial.29  The only difference was that each set 
of jurors was presented with different eyewitness evidence.  One group was 
told that no eyewitness existed, and only 18% voted to convict.30  Another 
group heard a store clerk testify that he saw the defendant commit the 
crime, and 72% voted to convict, despite the defense lawyer’s argument 
that the clerk was mistaken.31  Amazingly, when the third group learned that 
the store clerk “was legally blind and not wearing his glasses at the time” of 
the crime, an incredible 68% of the jurors still voted to convict.32  This 
demonstrates how willing jurors are to simply accept eyewitness testimony 
without any critical evaluation whatsoever. 
Unfortunately, as Part III illustrates, eyewitness identification 
evidence—evidence that is generally proven to be highly unreliable—can 
be made even less reliable, and consequently more harmful, when police 
use show-up procedures instead of lineups or photo arrays. 
III. SHOW-UPS: INCREASING THE RISK OF MISIDENTIFICATION 
A show-up is an identification procedure in which the police present a 
single suspect to an eyewitness and then ask the eyewitness whether the 
suspect is the perpetrator.33  Typically, show-ups are conducted in the area 
of, and shortly after, the alleged crime.34  Often, when the eyewitness views 
the sole suspect, the suspect will be in police custody and may even be 
hand-cuffed or locked in a police squad car.35  Show-ups are very 
 
29 Luria, supra note 19, at 525 (citing Elizabeth Loftus, Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOL. 




33 See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 584 n.1 (Wis. 2005) (“A ‘showup’ is an out-of-
court pretrial identification procedure in which a suspect is presented singly to a witness for 
identification purposes.”).  A show-up is usually conducted live and in person between the 
witness and the arrested suspect.  However, show-ups can also take the form of photo show-
ups, where a single photo, rather than a photo array, is presented to a witness.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Blake, Nos. BRCR2006-0851 & BRCR2006-0852, 2007 WL 3104405 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2007). 
34 In fact, police commonly conduct show-ups at the crime scene and within a short time 
after the crime for purposes of convenience.  As a result, even courts that are bound to 
follow the minority rule have gradually carved out an exception based on “temporal and 
spatial considerations.”  People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 657 (N.Y. 1991); see also 
Commonwealth v. Wen Chaio Ye, 756 N.E.2d 640, 645 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (permitting 
the use of a show-up when conducted within ninety minutes and at the scene of the crime). 
35 See e.g., People v. Clark, 673 N.Y.S.2d 308 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (involving a 
suspect who was arrested and locked in squad car at time of show-up); People v. Hall, 617 
N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (noting same); People v. Knight 535 N.Y.S.2d 31 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (noting same). 
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convenient for law enforcement as they allow for a quick and easy 
resolution of the investigation, without having to take the time to assemble 
a lineup or photo array.36 
Unfortunately, the convenience of a show-up comes at a high price: the 
increased risk of a false identification.  First, in a show-up, the risk of a 
false identification falls entirely on the sole suspect and is not spread out 
among six or eight individuals, as it would be in a lineup or photo array.37  
Second, the way in which show-ups are necessarily conducted makes them 
incredibly suggestive.  As one expert has stated, show-ups are “the most 
grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the 
police.”38 
Show-ups are grossly suggestive in part because the sole suspect is 
already in custody and is being presented by a police officer.  Eyewitnesses 
often believe that when an officer presents a suspect for identification, the 
officer has caught the true perpetrator.  Few people would think that an 
officer would show a suspect without truly believing that the suspect was, 
in fact, the criminal.39  Even one state’s attorney general has conceded that 
show-ups “convey the impression to witnesses that the police think they 
have caught the perpetrator and want confirmation.”40  Lineups and photo 
arrays, of course, are far less suggestive; if conducted properly, the witness 
will not know which person the officer believes to be the true perpetrator 
and, therefore, will not be influenced in the identification process.41 
Other factors also make show-ups highly suggestive.  For example, 
when show-ups are conducted immediately after a crime and near the crime 
scene, as is usually the case, the eyewitness may make a positive 
identification simply because the suspect was in the area at the time and not 
 
36 See Lee, supra note 1, at 759 (discussing how the benefit of show-ups includes the 
speedy resolution of law enforcement investigations); see also infra Part V.A.2. 
37 See Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 594 (“A lineup or photo array is generally fairer than a 
showup, because it distributes the probability of identification among the number of persons 
arrayed, thus reducing the risk of a misidentification.” (citing Richard Gonzales et al., 
Response Biases in Lineups and Showups, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525, 527 
(1993))). 
38 Lee, supra note 1, at 769 (quoting Patrick M. Wall, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 28 (1965)). 
39 See United States v. Funches, 84 F.3d 249, 254 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A show-up is 
inherently suggestive because the witness is likely to be influenced by the fact that the police 
appear to believe the person brought in is guilty, since presumably the police would not 
bring in someone that they did not suspect had committed the crime.” (citation omitted)). 
40 WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, MODEL POLICY AND 
PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 22 (2005). 
41 See id. 
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because he is actually the perpetrator.42  Police can also consciously or 
subconsciously influence an eyewitness’s identification by what they say 
and do and the manner in which they present the suspect during the show-
up procedure.43 
Social science research supports the commonsense conclusion that 
show-ups are highly suggestive, making already bad evidence (eyewitness 
identifications) even worse.  One study revealed that “when the 
identification was conducted twenty-four hours afterwards, fourteen percent 
of those who viewed a lineup made a mistaken identification, whereas fifty-
three percent of those who viewed a show-up made a mistaken 
identification.”44  Other research has also documented the suggestive nature 
of show-ups, as well as their link to false identifications and wrongful 
convictions.45 
Interestingly, however, the risk inherent in a show-up extends much 
further than simply the wrongful conviction of an innocent person.46  That 
is, in a show-up, when the witness makes a false identification, the innocent 
suspect will be arrested and prosecuted, and law enforcement will not 
continue to search for the true perpetrator.47  With a lineup or photo array, 
 
42 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Mass. 1995) (permitting 
show-ups “in the immediate aftermath of a crime,” even in the absence of exigency). 
43 See Lee, supra note 1, at 760 (discussing how officers may require a suspect to wear 
clothing allegedly worn by the perpetrator, or require the suspect to hold a weapon or other 
object that was allegedly used by the perpetrator); see also Brisco v. Ercole, 565 F.3d 80, 84-
85 (2d Cir. 2009) (involving show-up conducted while suspect was surrounded by uniformed 
officers and was forced to model an article of clothing similar to that worn by the 
perpetrator); People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. 1991) (involving show-up 
conducted while suspect wearing handcuffs and detained in a squad car, thereby suggesting 
that suspect was, in fact, the perpetrator). 
44 Lee, supra note 1, at 770 (emphasis added) (citing A.D. Yarmey et al., Accuracy of 
Eyewitness Identifications in Show-ups and Lineups, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 464 
(1996)). 
45 See, e.g., Luria, supra note 19, at 516; Richard Gonzalez, Phoebe C. Ellsworth & 
Maceo Pembroke, Response Biases in Lineups and Showups, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 525 (1993); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential Lineups, and 
Showups: Eyewitness Identification Decisions of Adults and Children, 21 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 391 (1997). 
46 A conviction based on unreliable eyewitness identification evidence poses a unique 
problem in the criminal justice system.  For example, a constitutional violation does indeed 
occur when a defendant is convicted based on illegally obtained, but otherwise reliable, 
physical evidence.  Nonetheless, the end result, albeit unjustified, is that a factually guilty 
defendant is convicted.  Conversely, prosecuting a defendant with unreliable show-up 
evidence is not only a constitutional violation, but it advances no competing interest 
whatsoever as a factually innocent defendant may well be convicted.  See State v. Adams, 
423 N.E.2d 379, 383 (N.Y. 1981). 
47 See Findley, supra note 22, at 138 (discussing the dual problem of failing to convict 
the guilty while wrongly convicting the innocent). 
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however, if the witness makes a false identification, he will identify a 
subject that the police have purposely inserted as filler.  Consequently, the 
witness’s misidentification will be known to the police, who can then 
continue with their investigation and their search for the true perpetrator.48 
Social science research proves that show-ups have a special place in 
the realm of eyewitness identification evidence.  First, eyewitness 
identification evidence, even when produced by lineup and photo array 
procedures, is hopelessly unreliable and is largely responsible for the 
wrongful convictions in our country.  Second, show-up procedures produce 
even less reliable eyewitness evidence, which makes already bad evidence 
even worse, and is even more likely to result in false identifications and 
wrongful convictions. 
IV. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SHOW-UPS 
Given the long held belief in American jurisprudence that “it is far 
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free,”49 one 
might think that show-up evidence would not be admissible at a defendant’s 
trial.  The reality, however, is that the Supreme Court’s framework⎯also 
known as the majority approach or the majority rule⎯offers virtually no 
due process protection against show-up evidence. 
In addition, only a small number of states offer any meaningful 
protection under their own state constitutions.  Instead, most states follow 
the majority rule, which employs a malleable and outdated facts-and-
circumstances analysis and allows prosecutors nearly unrestricted use of 
show-up identification evidence at criminal trials.50  Some states, however, 
have chosen to afford their citizens greater protection against false 
identifications and wrongful convictions by implementing meaningful 
reform. 
States have taken two different approaches to reform.  First, there is 
evolutionary reform, in which the majority rule’s facts-and-circumstances 
framework is updated and modernized to allow courts, at least in theory, to 
better assess the reliability of show-up evidence.51  Second, there is 
revolutionary reform, in which the majority rule’s facts-and-circumstances 
framework is rejected and show-ups are generally not admissible, unless a 
specific exception to the general prohibition can be satisfied.  Because of its 
theoretical and fundamental differences from the majority rule, this 
 
48 See id. 
49 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970). 
50 See infra Part IV.A. 
51 See infra Part IV.B. 
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revolutionary reform is also called the minority approach or the minority 
rule.52 
A.  SUPREME COURT FRAMEWORK⎯THE MAJORITY RULE 
The majority rule governing the admissibility of show-up evidence is 
based on a series of United States Supreme Court decisions from the 1970s.  
Even at the time of those decisions, the Court was well aware that 
eyewitness identifications could be incredibly unreliable.53  The Court’s 
response to the problem was to develop a factor-based approach that was, in 
theory, designed to admit only reliable identifications into evidence. 
In United States v. Biggers, the Court held that a show-up 
identification does not violate due process if “under the totality of 
circumstances the identification was reliable even though the confrontation 
procedure was suggestive.”54  The Court listed five factors to be considered 
in evaluating reliability: 
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the 
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and 
the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.55 
Prosecutors are easily able to satisfy this totality-of-circumstances test, 
and as a result, show-up evidence is routinely admitted at trial.  Conversely 
stated, this factor-laden approach allows for a tremendous amount of 
flexibility, and few, if any, show-up identifications are ever excluded under 
this framework.56  This approach was then affirmed in Manson v. 
Brathwaite, a case in which the Court terminated any real hope that it 
would offer due process protection based on the suggestiveness of the 
identification procedures.  Instead, it affirmed that “reliability is the 
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.”57 
Social science research, however, has shown that most of the Biggers 
factors do not accurately measure reliability and, therefore, do not address 
the risk of misidentification, as the Court had hoped.  First, the witness’s 
opportunity to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime “does not 
 
52 See infra Part IV.C. 
53 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (discussing how the practice of 
showing suspects singly to crime victims for the purpose of identification has been widely 
condemned). 
54 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). 
55 Id. at 199-200. 
56 See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, U. ILL. L. 
REV. 223, 226 (1987) (discussing research showing motions to suppress identifications are 
rarely granted). 
57 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). 
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translate into an eyewitness being able to accurately recall the suspect.”58  
Second, the witness’s degree of attention can be easily misstated, and 
further, this factor actually ignores more important considerations of stress 
and anxiety, which cause identifications to be less reliable.  For example, 
someone who is held at gunpoint is likely to be quite attentive, at least with 
regard to the gun, but at the same time, will probably not produce a reliable 
identification because of the high degree of stress and anxiety experienced 
in such a situation.59 
Third, although the majority approach requires the assessment of the 
witness’s level of confidence when identifying the suspect, the social 
science research shows that a witness’s confidence level is not indicative of 
accuracy.  In fact, many studies have shown little or no predictive 
relationship between a witness’s confidence in his identification and the 
accuracy of that identification.60  Further, confidence can be increased 
artificially.  For example, positive feedback from an officer after the 
identification procedure will reaffirm the witness’s choice, thereby 
increasing confidence.  This type of feedback from police, even when 
unintentional, not only inflates the eyewitness’s confidence level, but 
studies have shown that it also “leads them to report that they had a better 
view of the culprit, that they could make out details of the face . . . that their 
memorial image of the [person was] particularly clear, and that they are 
adept at recognizing faces of strangers.”61 
Consequently, realizing the ineffectiveness of the majority rule and its 
out-dated factors, some states have modernized the factor-laden analysis in 
order to allow courts to more accurately assess the reliability of show-up 
identifications.  This approach offers marginal improvement over the 
majority rule and is therefore best described as an evolutionary approach to 
reform. 
B.  EVOLUTION⎯IMPROVING THE MAJORITY RULE 
In light of this social science evidence and the DNA exonerations of 
falsely identified and wrongfully convicted defendants, some 
states⎯particularly Utah and Kansas⎯have taken steps to improve the 
majority rule.  The Utah Supreme Court, for example, essentially modified 
 
58 TerBeek, supra note 16, at 24 (citing Michael R. Leippe et al., Crime Seriousness as a 
Determinant of Accuracy in Eyewitness Identification, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 345, 345 
(1978)). 
59 See Gambell, supra note 1, at 219. 
60 See Lee, supra note 1, at 770 (citing Yarmey et al., supra note 44, at 464). 
61 O’Toole & Shay, supra note 28, at 121 (citing Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, 
“Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the 
Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 374 (1998)). 
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and expanded the Biggers factors to address their shortcomings.62  Utah’s 
factors now require a more thorough analysis of the circumstances under 
which the identification was made.  For example, when analyzing the 
witness’s opportunity to view the suspect, Utah requires consideration of 
the length of time the witness viewed the actor; the distance between the witness and 
the actor; whether the witness could view the actor’s face; the lighting or lack of it; 
whether there were distracting noises or activity during the observation; and any other 
circumstances affecting the witness’s opportunity to observe the actor.63 
Additionally, under Utah’s framework, a court must also consider 
“whether the witness’s capacity to observe was impaired by stress or fright 
at the time of the observation, by personal motivations, biases, or 
prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or 
alcohol.”64  Utah also added the factor requiring a court to consider 
“whether the witness’s identification was . . . the product of suggestion.”65  
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court adopted the Utah factors, but 
cautioned that “our acceptance should not be considered as a rejection of 
the Biggers model but, rather, as a refinement in the analysis.”66 
The Utah and Kansas models, while very well-intended, offer only 
marginal or incremental improvement to the fundamentally flawed majority 
rule.  First, the malleable nature of any facts-and-circumstances type of 
analysis still allows for manipulation by police, prosecutors, and judges and 
can easily result in the admission of unreliable evidence.67  Second, even 
when the factors are applied in good faith, the problem remains that the 
show-up procedure is itself inherently suggestive, and as a result, the factors 
become “infected by the suggestive identification methods.”68 
For these and other reasons, some states have decided to completely 
reject, rather than merely improve upon, the majority rule.  This approach, 
which is discussed in Part III.C, essentially starts anew and is, therefore, 
best described as a revolutionary approach to reform. 
 
62 See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
63 Id. at 782. 
64 Id. at 783. 
65 Id. at 784. 
66 State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 576 (Kan. 2003). 
67 See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini, Judicial (In)Discretion: How Courts Circumvent the 
Confrontation Clause Under Crawford and Davis, 75 TENN. L. REV. 753 (2008) (illustrating 
how prosecutors and judges are able to manipulate the Supreme Court’s facts-and-
circumstances framework in the Sixth Amendment context in order to bypass a defendant’s 
right of confrontation). 
68 O’Toole & Shay, supra note 28, at 122. 
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C.  REVOLUTION⎯THE MINORITY RULE 
In light of the complete failure of the majority rule to offer any due 
process protection, as well as the limited benefits available under an 
incremental, evolutionary approach to reform, some states⎯particularly 
New York, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin⎯have rejected the majority 
rule’s factor-based framework.  Instead, these states have chosen a more 
revolutionary approach to reform. 
Under this reform, also known as the minority approach or the 
minority rule, the treatment of show-up identification evidence is much 
simpler.  Because show-ups are inherently suggestive, such evidence is 
generally not admissible at trial.69  There are, of course, exceptions to this 
general rule.  Show-up evidence may be used at trial if, at the time of the 
show-up: (1) there existed exigent circumstances that prevented the police 
from conducting a lineup or photo array; or (2) the police lacked probable 
cause to arrest the defendant, again preventing them from conducting a 
lineup or photo array.70 
First, a brief example will illustrate the intended use of the exigent 
circumstances exception.  Consider the hypothetical scenario from Part I, in 
which the perpetrator robbed the victim at gunpoint and took his wallet 
before fleeing on foot.  However, for purposes of this example, also assume 
that the victim suffered ill health, which was exacerbated by the stress of 
the robbery.  After the crime, he was in a very weak condition, and the 
police rushed him to a nearby hospital.  Further assume that the police did 
not know whether the victim would survive or for how long.  The police 
therefore brought the suspect into the hospital room for a show-up 
procedure.  Under these facts, the exigent circumstances—that is, the ill 
health of the victim—would have prevented the police from assembling a 
 
69 See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 
N.E.2d 1257 (Mass. 1995); State v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1981). 
70 Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 584-85.  New York and Massachusetts describe the test 
differently.  New York recognizes show-ups as “flawed” procedures and requires a showing 
of need to justify their use.  Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 382-83.  Massachusetts recognizes show-
ups as “disfavored” procedures and requires a showing of “exigent circumstances” to justify 
their use.  Johnson, 650 N.E.2d at 1259.  However, both states have also carved out an 
exception for show-ups conducted close in time or place to the crime, regardless of need or 
exigency.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wen Chaio Ye, 756 N.E.2d 640, 645 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2001) (admitting a show-up in large part because it was conducted within one and one-half 
hours of the crime); People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. 1991) (admitting a show-
up in large part because it was conducted “within minutes and within a New York City block 
and a half” of the crime).  This exception appears to be nothing more than an exception for 
police convenience and, in both New York and Massachusetts, has the effect of completely 
swallowing the general rule excluding show-ups.  In addition, this police convenience 
exception actually creates a near per se rule of admissibility for show-up evidence.  See 
Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d at 658 (Titone, J., concurring); see also infra Parts V.A.1-2. 
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lineup and bringing the victim to the police station for a viewing.  Because 
this situation meets the exigent circumstances exception, the show-up 
identification would be admissible at trial.71 
Second, an example will also illustrate the intended use of the probable 
cause exception.  Consider the same hypothetical scenario from Part I and 
assume, once again, that the crime victim is healthy and mobile.  However, 
this time assume that the suspect is simply standing innocently on the 
corner and makes no attempt to leave the area when approached by police.  
Further assume that he does not meet the general description of the 
perpetrator, and when he is frisked, he does not possess the folding pocket 
knife or anything else illegal.  In this case, the only thing linking him to the 
crime is his proximity to the crime scene.  As a result, the police would not 
have probable cause to arrest him, transport him to the police station, and 
force him to take part in a lineup.72  Consequently, the only viable option 
for the police would be a show-up.  Because this situation meets the 
probable cause exception—or perhaps more accurately, the lack of probable 
cause exception—the show-up identification would be admissible at trial. 
Admittedly, there is something counterintuitive about the probable 
cause exception to the minority rule’s general prohibition on show-ups.  
That is, the suspect has done nothing wrong; in fact, he has behaved so 
innocently (perhaps because he is innocent) that the police don’t even have 
probable cause for an arrest, which is an incredibly low burden to begin 
with.  Precisely because the suspect appears to be innocent, he cannot be 
arrested and, therefore, does not have the right to a fair identification 
procedure, such as a lineup or photo array.  Instead, his apparent innocence 
counter-intuitively subjects him to a show-up, the procedure most likely to 
lead to a false identification and wrongful conviction.73 
This paradox notwithstanding, the revolutionary approach to reform 
(the minority rule) is still far superior to the majority rule’s facts-and-
circumstances framework, which routinely allows prosecutors the 
unrestricted use of show-up identification evidence at trial.  Additionally, 
the minority rule is superior to the incremental, evolutionary reform 
implemented in Utah and Kansas, which, while certainly an improvement 
 
71 This hypothetical scenario was derived from the case Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 
(1967). 
72 Probable cause is best defined as the existence of any facts or circumstances that 
would “lead a reasonable officer to believe that guilt is more than a possibility.”  CHRISTINE 
WISEMAN & MICHAEL TOBIN, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2:22, at 43 (2d ed. 
2008). 
73 This odd glitch in the minority rule is easily remedied and is addressed more fully 
infra Part VI. 
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over the majority rule, still maintains the majority rule’s malleable facts-
and-circumstances framework. 
Consequently, this Article advocates for the Supreme Court’s adoption 
of the minority rule⎯the rule that has already been adopted in varying 
forms by New York, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin74⎯in order to better 
protect due process rights.75  However, as Part V illustrates, the minority 
rule’s prohibition on show-ups is easily evaded by courts that wish to admit 
such evidence at trial.  Therefore, the rule still requires significant 
modification in order to more fully protect innocent defendants from false 
eyewitness identifications and wrongful convictions. 
V. JUDICIAL ABUSE: THWARTING THE REVOLUTION 
Commentators have reasonably predicted that if a jurisdiction were to 
implement the minority rule, its general prohibition on show-up evidence 
would eventually, if not immediately, force police officers to discontinue 
their use of show-up procedures.76  Unfortunately, however, this has not 
occurred in jurisdictions that currently subscribe to the minority approach.  
The reason for this is that courts continue to tolerate, and even approve of, 
the use of show-ups, despite their general prohibition. 
It may, at first, seem unlikely that courts could permit the use of show-
up evidence at trial under the minority approach.  After all, the minority 
rule strictly prohibits the use of show-ups unless exigent circumstances 
existed, or the police lacked probable cause to arrest the suspect, thereby 
preventing the use of more reliable identification procedures.  In fact, the 
 
74 The minority rule discussed in this Article is actually the Wisconsin rule expressed in 
Dubose.  Wisconsin is the most recent of the three states⎯New York, Massachusetts, and 
Wisconsin⎯to have abandoned the majority rule in favor of revolutionary reform.  
However, the Wisconsin rule is expressed most clearly and, perhaps due to its recency, has 
not yet been eroded by new exceptions, such as the police convenience exception that has 
been adopted by both New York and Massachusetts.  See cases discussed supra, note 70. 
75 “[E]xperimentation in state courts serves to guide the United States Supreme Court in 
its determinations . . . .  ‘Indeed, state judicial review may be said to foster the values of 
federalism by allowing the nation to profit by using what succeeds in a state and avoiding 
what fails.’” Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 597-98 n.19 (citing Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 966 (1982) (quoting Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
State Constitutional Law, New Judicial Federalism, and the Rehnquist Court, 51 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 339, 347 (2004))). 
76 See Luria, supra note 19, at 545 (“[M]aking admissibility of showup identifications 
contingent upon exigency and immediacy will more effectively deter police officers from 
engaging in [show-up] procedures because the threat of exclusion will loom large.”); 
Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial 
Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY. L.J. 259, 304 (1990) (“[I]f a 
per se rule were enforced, the police would soon stop using unnecessarily suggestive 
procedures.”). 
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minority approach and its underlying policy are quite clear.  Nonetheless, 
courts have easily bypassed the rule by dramatically expanding the use of 
its two exceptions.77  Wherever exceptions exist—here, the exigent 
circumstances exception and the probable cause exception—courts can 
simply expand and distort them in order to reach a predetermined 
outcome—here, the admission of unreliable show-up evidence at trial. 
A.  EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
The first exception to the minority approach and its general prohibition 
on show-up evidence is the exigent circumstances exception.  If, at the time 
of the show-up, exigent circumstances prevented the use of a lineup or 
photo array, then the show-up was justified and may be admitted at trial.78  
There are at least two ways in which courts have inappropriately expanded 
this exception in order to admit show-up evidence.  First, courts have 
misapplied the concept of exigency by adopting the Fourth Amendment 
definition of the term; and second, they have simply found exigency where 
none exists. 
1.  Confusion with Fourth Amendment Exigency 
The concept of exigency is well known in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  For example, if the police become aware of a fast-paced, 
fluid, and potentially life-threatening situation inside of a home, they are 
not required to obtain a warrant prior to entering that home.  Instead, they 
may rely on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement 
and simply enter without a warrant, and without consent, in order to aid 
potential crime victims.79  Requiring a warrant in this circumstance would 
severely hamper a critical law enforcement function—and could be 
extremely detrimental to the citizens inside of the home who may be in 
need of police assistance. 
Similarly, courts can, and often do, find this same type of exigency in 
the context of the show-up situation in order to justify the use of a show-up 
procedure.  Again consider the hypothetical scenario from Part I.  There, the 
perpetrator robbed the victim at gunpoint and then fled on foot with the 
victim’s wallet.  The police, while en route to the crime scene, spotted the 
 
77 See Lee, supra note 1, at 756 (“Police departments are often able to continue 
suggestive procedures and rely on . . . the leniency of the court.”); Luria, supra note 19, at 
540 (“[P]olice officers have little incentive to use more reliable methods of identification, 
such as a lineup, because the showup identification will not be suppressed.”). 
78 See Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 584-85. 
79 See, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (upholding police entry 
into a home to render assistance to potential victims when there was reason to believe that 
violence was occurring within the home). 
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suspect, who matched the perpetrator’s general description.  The police 
arrested the suspect for a reason unrelated to the robbery and held him in 
police custody a short distance from the crime scene.  Does this situation, 
fast-paced and fluid as it is, constitute exigent circumstances to justify the 
use of a show-up instead of a more reliable lineup or photo array? 
Yes, according to many courts.  For example, one court held that the 
“unbroken chain of events⎯crime, escape, pursuit, apprehension and 
identifications⎯all within minutes and within a New York City block and a 
half” justified the use of a show-up.80  The court’s reasoning was that “fast-
paced street episodes and encounters” constitute sufficient exigency to 
render a show-up necessary.81  Show-ups in these types of circumstances 
are necessary, the court believed, because the police rightly want 
“reasonable assurances that they have arrested or detained the right 
person.”82  Another court echoed this sentiment when it held that “it was 
critically important for the protection of the community that the police 
make extraordinary efforts to locate the true perpetrator and eliminate the 
risk of further violent behavior, and that this concern fully justified the 
police decision to employ a show-up in this case.”83 
There are several problems with this reasoning.  First, show-ups 
simply cannot provide any level of assurance that the police have arrested 
the true perpetrator.  Recall that the problem with show-ups is that they are 
highly unreliable.84  If show-ups were as reliable as lineups or photo arrays, 
then their immediate use at the scene of the crime would not be 
troublesome.  “However, the circumstances which surround these one-on-
one procedures also involve a high degree of suggestiveness, which gives 
rise, in turn, to a substantial risk of error.”85  Consequently, any perceived 
assurances that flow from the use of show-up procedures are purely 
illusory. 
Second, not only do show-ups fail to provide these much desired 
assurances, but their use also poses distinct risks, not only to the defendant 
but also to the community.  Recall that at the time of the show-up, the 
suspect was already arrested and remained in police custody for an 
 
80 People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. 1991); see also Commonwealth v. Wen 
Chao Ye, 756 N.E.2d 640, 645 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (permitting show-up made near in 
time and place to crime); People v. Briscoe, 788 N.E.2d 611, 612 (N.Y. 2003) (permitting 
show-up in the “context of a continuous, ongoing investigation”). 
81 Wen Chao Ye, 756 N.E.2d at 657. 
82 Id. 
83 Trial Court Memorandum at 6, Wisconsin v. Siebeneich, No. 2007-CF-0478 (Cir. Ct. 
Kenosha County 2007) [hereinafter Siebeneich, Tr. Ct. Mem.] (on file with authors). 
84 See supra Part III; see also Lee, supra note 1, at 770. 
85 Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d at 659 (Titone, J., concurring). 
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unrelated reason.86  At this point, there are only two mutually exclusive 
possibilities: either the suspect is or is not the true perpetrator of the 
robbery.  If the suspect is, in fact, the perpetrator, the community is no safer 
as a result of the show-up because the suspect is already under arrest and is 
being transported to the police station anyway.  Therefore, a lineup or photo 
array could have been conducted just as easily as the show-up.87  In other 
words, as another court was forced to concede, the police “had the luxury of 
some time, because [the suspect] was in custody.”88 
Alternatively, if the suspect is not the perpetrator, then the community 
obviously is no safer and, in fact, is far less safe because of the show-up.  
Why?  Because instead of continuing the search for the true perpetrator in 
the immediate area, the police stopped their investigation and used several 
officers to conduct a highly unreliable show-up procedure focused on an 
innocent man.  During this time, of course, the true perpetrator had gone 
free, perhaps to continue his crime-spree or to commit new, unrelated 
crimes.  Therefore, regardless of whether the suspect is or is not the true 
perpetrator, the community is either no safer or far less safe as a result of 
the show-up procedure. 
The third problem with the reasoning in support of show-ups is that at 
best it completely misapplies, or at worst intentionally distorts, the concept 
of exigent circumstances.  The reason is that in nearly every case where a 
show-up is conducted, there will be exigent circumstances in the Fourth 
Amendment sense of the term.  That is, there will nearly always be the risk 
that the perpetrator is in the middle of an ongoing crime-spree, or that he 
will commit a second, unrelated crime, or that he will simply escape arrest 
and punishment for his completed crime.  Therefore, if this is the standard 
for exigency, then the exigent circumstances exception swallows the 
minority rule whole, and show-ups should be permitted in every case.89 
 
86 In our hypothetical example, the suspect was in custody for unrelated reasons.  In other 
cases, the suspect will be in custody for the crime under investigation.  See id. (“[T]he 
arresting officers, who had chased and subdued defendant as he alit from the taxi, had no 
doubt that they had the ‘right man’ in custody and had no thought of releasing him whatever 
the outcome of any subsequent identification might be.”). 
87 See id. (stating that “there is no reason not to ‘[f]reez[e] the frame at the point of 
apprehension’” and conduct a more reliable procedure such as a lineup or photo array). 
88 Siebeneich, Tr. Ct. Mem., supra note 83, at 5. 
89 Other courts and legal commentators, having been conditioned to the concept of 
exigency in the Fourth Amendment context, have also made the mistake of using Fourth 
Amendment exigency when analyzing show-ups.  See, e.g., State v. Dodd, 2008 Wis. App. 
LEXIS 696, at *3-4 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2008) (describing exigency in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment, rather than whether the exigency prevented the use of a lineup or photo 
array); Luria, supra note 19, at 528 (discussing exigency in the proper context, but also in 
the classic Fourth Amendment context). 
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What the courts tend to gloss over is this: the minority approach 
requires that, in order to qualify under the exigency exception, the exigency 
must be such that it prevents the use of a lineup or photo array.90  Going 
back to our hypothetical robbery scenario in Part I, nothing in that set of 
facts prevented the use of a lineup or photo array.  The suspect was already 
in custody, and the victim was capable of (and certainly would have been 
safer) traveling to the police station where a lineup or photo array could 
have been assembled.  All the while, the police could have continued their 
investigation in the immediate area of the crime scene, rather than diverting 
resources to conduct an unreliable show-up procedure.  This course of 
action—and not the show-up procedure—would have truly protected the 
community while simultaneously reducing the risk of the false 
identification of an innocent man. 
Instead of the always-present Fourth Amendment type of exigency, the 
classic (and perhaps only) type of exigency that qualifies under the 
exception for show-ups is the case of the ill or dying witness.91  In that 
situation, if the show-up is not conducted immediately, the witness may die 
and no identification would be made.  Under these circumstances, the 
identification must be made posthaste, or the guilty man could go free.  
There simply is no time, under these circumstances, to take the ill or dying 
witness to the police station while a lineup or photo array is assembled.  
This, not the Fourth Amendment type of exigency, is the situation 
envisioned by the exigent circumstances exception to the minority rule and 
its general prohibition on show-ups. 
2.  Watered-Down Exigency 
Having established that the relevant type of exigency is one that truly 
prevents the use of a lineup or photo array, courts still have other ways of 
expanding the exigent circumstances exception in order to admit show-up 
evidence at trial.  The most straightforward of these ways is simply to find 
exigency where none exists. 
Again consider the hypothetical scenario from Part I, in which a victim 
was robbed at gun point in his apartment, and the perpetrator fled on foot.  
This time, assume that an eyewitness witnessed the crime at about 9:30 p.m.  
Further assume that the eyewitness was a federal government employee 
who resided in a neighboring state and had planned to leave for home the 
next day.  Finally, assume that the police had actually arrested the suspect 
 
90 See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 584-85 (Wis. 2005) (allowing the use of show-
ups when, “as a result of . . . exigent circumstances, [the police] could not have conducted a 
lineup or photo array”) (emphasis added). 
91 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
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and were able to interview the eyewitness about one hour after the crime, 
at 10:30 p.m. 
Do these facts constitute exigent circumstances to justify the show-up?  
Yes, according to many courts; in fact, one court held, under nearly 
identical facts, that “the totality of the circumstances justified a show-up 
identification because exigent circumstances of [the witness’s] immediate 
but highly limited availability to identify the suspect was likely to be lost 
absent a show-up identification.”92 
The problem with this reasoning is that it confuses exigency with 
police convenience.  In fact, the officer who conducted the show-up in this 
case even testified that “it’s a big inconvenience [not to conduct a show-up] 
when you have cooperative witnesses standing around.  Furthermore, 
holding on to a witness for multiple hours to conduct a lineup at the jail, 
that would not have been practical.”93  Despite this revealing and 
surprisingly honest admission by the officer, the court was willing to take 
these facts and somehow turn an “inconvenience” into an exigency.94 
Some courts have gone even further.  Instead of trying to force various 
factual scenarios into the exigency framework, they have found it easier to 
gradually and subtly replace the minority rule’s exigency exception with a 
police convenience exception.  For example, some courts will allow show-
ups if there is “good reason” to do so.95  “The good reason inquiry does not 
require a showing that the one-on-one identification was necessary, only 
that the police have good cause for their actions.”96  The term “good cause” 
has, in turn, come to be synonymous with police convenience.  That is, 
simply because photo arrays and lineups take more time, the police will 
nearly always be justified in conducting a show-up procedure instead.97 
Other courts have expanded this police convenience exception to 
include the use of show-ups whenever they are conducted near in time and 
place to the crime.  One court justified this because “[t]emporal and spatial 
 
92 Dodd, 2008 Wis. App. LEXIS 696, at *4. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Commonwealth v. Austin, 657 N.E.2d 458, 460 (Mass. 1995). 
96 Commonwealth v. Blake, Nos. BRCR2006-0851 & BRCR2006-0852, 2007 WL 
3104405, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 
N.E.2d 555 (Mass. 2006)). 
97 See Blake, 2007 WL 3104405, at *5 (permitting the use of a show-up because 
assembling a photo array “would have taken about an hour to an hour and a half”); Martin, 
850 N.E.2d at 561 (permitting the use of a show-up because assembling a photo array 
“would be unnecessarily burdensome”); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 857 N.E.2d 1096 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (permitting the use of a show-up because assembly of a photo array 
would have taken additional time); Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 781 N.E.2d 46 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2003) (permitting same). 
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considerations become so intertwined that precious compartmentalization to 
discern levels of exigency, involving fast-paced street episodes and 
encounters, is unwarranted.”98  Of course, most show-ups are conducted 
near in time and place to the crime.  Consequently, “this syllogism results in 
its own rule of per se or presumptive admissibility” of show-ups, thus 
turning the minority rule completely on its head.99  In other words, 
The [court’s] holding rests on its [equating] . . . temporal and spatial proximity to the 
crime with the exigency element of the due process analysis.  To support its position, 
the [court] then invokes a series of phrases and concepts, including an ‘unbroken 
chain of events,’ ‘fast-paced street episodes and encounters,’ ‘fast-moving, 
uninterrupted array of activity’ and ‘the uncertain, emergent realities of these street 
situations.’  However, these phrases are insufficient to dispose of the due process 
problem presented [by the use of show-up procedures].100 
The holdings discussed in this section illustrate a recurring problem, 
both at the trial and appellate court levels.  After decades of routinely 
approving the use of show-ups—despite their well-known propensity to 
produce false identifications and wrongful convictions—courts simply have 
a difficult time understanding that the issue is not one of police 
convenience.  Rather, it is one of exigency.  The facts and circumstances 
surrounding the show-up must truly have prevented the use of a lineup or 
photo array, otherwise there really was no exigency at all. 
There is no question that police would rather stop their investigation, 
conduct an immediate show-up, and obtain a positive identification as well 
as closure to their case.  This is far more desirable to the police because it 
provides instant (but unreliable) results and also requires somewhat less 
work than assembling a lineup or photo array.  But again, exigency—not 
convenience—is the real test.  Nonetheless, one court actually upheld the 
constitutionality of a show-up in part because “the evidence suggests . . . at 
least the possibility that police detectives will be called away from their 
duties to either assemble or stand in the lineup.”101  Of course, given the 
minority rule’s plain language and underlying policy concerns, nothing 
could be further off-point. 
B.  PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
The second exception to the minority approach and its general 
prohibition on show-up evidence is the probable cause exception.  If, at the 
time of the show-up, the police lacked probable cause to arrest a suspect, 
 
98 People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 657 (N.Y. 1991). 
99 Id. at 658 (Titone, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
100 Id. 
101 Siebeneich, Tr. Ct. Mem., supra note 83, at 6. 
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they are unable to hold him legally in custody while assembling a lineup or 
photo array.  Consequently, a show-up is justified and will be admitted at 
trial.102 
When a defendant moves to suppress show-up evidence, and the 
prosecutor asserts the probable cause exception—that is, the prosecutor 
argues that probable cause did not exist at the time of the show-up—the 
trial judge is forced into foreign and uncomfortable territory.  Normally, 
judges will go to great lengths to find that the police did have probable 
cause to arrest a defendant.  Such a finding of probable cause accomplishes 
a number of things for the prosecutor, such as ensuring that all subsequent 
searches will be upheld as searches incident to a valid arrest.103  However, 
in the case of show-ups, the prosecutor is asking the court to find that the 
police lacked probable cause to arrest the suspect. 
There are at least two ways in which courts can misapply this probable 
cause exception in order to admit show-up evidence.  First, when courts are 
forced to acknowledge that probable cause for arrest did exist, they may 
attempt to distinguish the underlying basis for that probable cause in order 
to admit the show-up evidence.  Second, courts may simply find that 
probable cause for arrest did not exist, even when an abundance of case law 
has established that, under the facts, it did exist. 
1.  Probable Cause and the Independent Basis 
The purpose behind the probable cause exception to the minority 
approach is simple: if police do not have probable cause to arrest, then they 
cannot legally hold the suspect long enough to conduct a lineup or photo 
array.  Without being able to hold the suspect and compel his participation 
in a more time-consuming identification procedure, a show-up is the only 
procedure available to the police.  However, some courts set out with the 
goal of admitting the show-up evidence and, therefore, look for ways 
around the rule, even if their holdings violate the rule’s underlying policy 
and purpose. 
Again consider the hypothetical scenario from Part I, in which a victim 
was robbed at gun point in his apartment and the perpetrator fled on foot.  
Recall that the police had probable cause to arrest the suspect, and in fact 
did arrest the suspect, prior to the show-up.  But the basis for that arrest was 
the suspect’s possession of a folding knife, which was completely unrelated 
to the robbery being investigated.  Does that mean that the show-up 
procedure for the robbery was necessary and therefore admissible at trial?  
 
102 See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 584-85 (Wis. 2005). 
103 See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979) (upholding a search incident 
to a lawful arrest, even when the arrest is for an ordinance violation). 
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Yes, according to many courts, which have held under nearly identical facts 
that the police were justified in conducting the show-up.  Why?  Because, 
although the police had probable cause to arrest, the basis for that probable 
cause was something other than the robbery, which was the crime currently 
under investigation.104 
Courts employ this type of reasoning to defeat, rather than to apply, 
the minority approach and its general prohibition on show-ups.  The reason 
for the probable cause exception is this: if the police cannot legally arrest 
the suspect and take him to the police station, then a lineup or photo array 
cannot be conducted.  Conversely, if the suspect is arrested, then a lineup or 
photo array is not only possible but is required.  The obvious point that the 
trial courts often ignore is that it doesn’t matter why the suspect was, or 
could have been, arrested.  The fact is that once he is, or can be, arrested, 
regardless of the reason, he can be taken to the police station for a lineup or 
photo array.  The show-up is, therefore, no longer necessary, and a more 
reliable identification procedure is required. 
Fortunately, some courts have recognized this incredibly basic but 
critical point and corrected this erroneous reasoning.  Although it should 
not have been necessary, one appellate court specifically clarified that the 
reason or basis for a suspect’s arrest is irrelevant; rather, once arrested for 
any reason, a show-up is no longer necessary and a lineup or photo array is 
required.105 
2.  Role Reversal: No Finding of Probable Cause 
In Fourth Amendment scenarios where defendants move to suppress 
physical evidence of guilt, they often argue that the police lacked probable 
cause to arrest, and therefore, the physical evidence uncovered in the search 
incident to arrest should be excluded from evidence.  However, due to the 
incredibly minimal standard of “probable cause,” courts routinely deny 
these defense motions and nearly always uphold arrests and subsequent 
 
104 See State v. Nawrocki, 746 N.W.2d 509, 518 n.7 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining 
that even though the State conceded, and the trial court found “that officers had a legal basis 
upon which to detain Nawrocki,” the trial court nonetheless found the show-up necessary, 
and therefore admissible, because the basis for detaining Nawrocki was different than the 
crime under investigation at the time). 
105 See id. at 519 (“[W]here probable cause exists, whether it is related to the offense 
under investigation or some other offense, officers have the constitutional means to detain 
the suspect and secure an identification using a procedure that is less conducive to 
misidentification [than a show-up].” (emphasis added)); cf. People v. Milza, 529 N.Y.S.2d 
31 (N.Y App. Div. 1988) (finding the show-up justified in part because police had probable 
cause to arrest). 
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searches.106  In fact, probable cause only requires the existence of minimal 
facts and circumstances to “lead a reasonable officer to believe that guilt is 
more than a possibility.”107 
For example, in one case an officer arrested three individuals two days 
after reading a periodical that described the suspects as slim, black men 
within a five-year age span and a three-inch height span.108  It also 
described two of them as wearing dark clothing and one as wearing a white 
leather jacket and blue jeans with an emblem.109  In response to a 
defendant’s probable cause challenge, the court held that his “clothing 
alone might have established probable cause for his arrest.”110  Other cases 
have held that the recognition of height, weight, and facial features “bearing 
resemblance” to the description of the perpetrator is sufficient for probable 
cause.111  Sometimes, similarity in hair length alone is sufficient.112  
Probable cause has even been found where a witness gave a description of 
the perpetrator’s vehicle, and officers pulled over a vehicle that was similar 
but of a different color and make.113 
In short, Fourth Amendment challenges to arrests and searches are 
nearly always denied.114  The reality is that almost any fact or circumstance, 
no matter how vague, and even if later determined to be mistaken, will give 
rise to probable cause.115  And it is this same probable cause standard that is 
 
106 See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1375 (2008) (citing empirical research demonstrating that suppression 
motions are successful less than 1% of the time).  Further, the probable cause for an arrest 
need not even be related to the crime under investigation.  This allows the police to use a 
pretext, such as a minor ordinance violation, as a tool to arrest a suspect and investigate a 
completely unrelated crime for which the police have no probable cause.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1275 (7th Cir. 1997) (“After Whren, the officer’s subjective 
intentions ‘play no role’ in [the] probable cause inquiry.” (citing Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806 (1996))); see also United States v. Bass, 325 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Any 
ulterior motive an officer may have for making the stop is irrelevant.”). 
107 WISEMAN & TOBIN, supra note 72, at 43 (emphasis added); see also Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (requiring something more “than mere suspicion”). 
108 United States v. Carpenter, 342 F.3d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 2003). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (emphasis added). 
111 United States v. Thomas, 79 F. App’x 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2003). 
112 See State v. Guzy, 407 N.W.2d 548 (Wis. 1987). 
113 See Creighton v. Anderson, 922 F.2d 443, 450 (8th Cir. 1990). 
114 See Alschuler, supra note 106, at 1375. 
115 See, e.g., Kaminski v. City of Whitewater, 877 F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (E.D. Wis. 1995) 
(finding probable cause to arrest because defendant loosely matched the description of the 
perpetrator, was only “a few blocks from the victim’s apartment,” and there was no evidence 
that the victim’s allegation was untrustworthy); State v. Isham, 235 N.W.2d 506, 512 (Wis. 
1975) (finding probable cause to arrest due to defendant’s two-and-a-half block proximity to 
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to be applied under the minority approach in order to determine whether the 
show-up procedure was necessary.116  However, if a judge is determined to 
admit show-up evidence at trial, then he must struggle to make the opposite 
finding—that probable cause did not exist.  Once this finding is made, it 
necessarily follows that, without probable cause, the police could not have 
legally detained the defendant for a lineup or photo array, and the show-up 
was therefore necessary and admissible at trial. 
In states that apply the minority approach, courts have found that 
probable cause did not exist at the time of the show-up, even when the facts 
would have led to a finding of probable cause under a Fourth Amendment 
challenge.  That is, police are allowed to use show-up procedures even 
when they “had no doubt that they had the ‘right man’ in custody and had 
no thought of releasing him whatever the outcome of any subsequent 
identification might be.”117 
For example, in a case discussed earlier in this Article, two victims 
were held at gunpoint in their apartment by a white male wearing a tan 
jacket.118  The perpetrator then fled the scene in a pickup truck.119  Then, 
while responding to the victims’ 9-1-1 call, an officer observed a white 
male wearing a tan jacket standing next to a pickup truck, a mere two 
blocks from the crime scene.120  When the officer approached, the man 
attempted to get in his truck and leave.121  The officer, however, stopped 
and detained him.122  A show-up was conducted, and the victims identified 
the suspect as the perpetrator.123 
 
the crime scene, even though the perpetrator was reported to have short sleeves and no 
shoes, and the defendant had three-quarter sleeves and work boots). 
116 This Article is not inconsistent by arguing, on the one hand, for a seemingly different 
standard of exigency, while arguing on the other hand for the same standard of probable 
cause.  In fact, the exigency standard advanced in this Article is actually the same as the 
exigency standard employed in the Fourth Amendment context.  The only difference is that 
in the Fourth Amendment context, the exigency must be one that prevents the police from 
obtaining a search warrant, while in the show-up context, the exigency must be one that 
prevents the police from using a lineup or photo array.  This distinction is appropriate, and in 
fact required, based on the different nature of the police action.  Conversely, whether there is 
probable cause to arrest a suspect remains the same regardless of the constitutional issue 
being litigated. 
117 People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 659 (N.Y. 1991) (Titone, J., concurring). 
118 Transcript of Suppression Motion Hearing at 10, Wisconsin v. Siebeneich, No. 2007-
CF-0478 (Cir. Ct. Kenosha County 2007) [hereinafter Siebenach, Tr. Suppress. Mot. Hr’g] 
(on file with authors). 
119 Id. at 12. 
120 Id. at 3. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 3. 
123 Id. at 4-5. 
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The defendant moved to suppress the show-up, arguing that the police 
did have probable cause to arrest him and, therefore, should have arrested 
him and conducted a less suggestive identification procedure at the police 
station.124  In fact, the prosecutor conceded that probable cause did exist at 
the time of the show-up.125  Despite the prosecutor’s concession and the 
quantum of evidence that would have easily supported a finding of probable 
cause in a Fourth Amendment context—including the defendant’s race, sex, 
clothing, vehicle, attempted flight, and proximity to the crime scene—the 
court still concluded that probable cause did not exist, and therefore the 
show-up was permissible.126 
This example illustrates how the very same evidence that consistently 
amounts to probable cause in the Fourth Amendment context can easily be 
side-stepped in the show-up context.  In fact, it is interesting to imagine 
how the outcome in the above case would have differed if the officer would 
have arrested the suspect, searched him incident to arrest, and found the gun 
or other evidence linking him to the robbery.  Under those circumstances, 
the defendant would have argued that the search was incident to an 
unlawful arrest—that is, an arrest that lacked probable cause.  A lack of 
probable cause is, after all, the exact finding the judge made in the context 
of the show-up issue. 
However, under these circumstances, if the defendant was seeking to 
suppress the handgun evidence, nearly every judge would have rightly 
concluded that the defendant’s race, sex, clothing, vehicle, attempted flight, 
and proximity to the crime scene were sufficient to “lead a reasonable 
officer to believe that guilt [was] more than a possibility.”127  In other 
 
124 Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress at 6-7, Siebeneich, No. 2007-CF-
0478 (Cir. Ct. Kenosha County 2007) (on file with authors). 
125 Siebeneich, Tr. Ct. Mem., supra note 83, at 2. 
126 Id.  Actually, whether there was probable cause to arrest was, at best, a secondary 
issue at the motion hearing.  At the time of the show-up, the defendant had actually been 
arrested for reasons independent of the crime under investigation.  See Siebeneich, Tr. 
Suppress. Mot. H’rg, supra note 118, at 3.  Therefore, given the actual arrest, the issue of 
whether there was probable cause to arrest should have been moot.  Surprisingly, the trial 
court ruled that the show-up was admissible in part because the police did not have probable 
cause to arrest for the specific crime under investigation.  See Siebeneich, Tr. Ct. Mem., 
supra note 83, at 5.  The trial court’s erroneous reasoning was later corrected by State v. 
Nawrocki, 746 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008), which overruled a different trial court 
that had admitted show-up evidence on identical grounds.  See supra Part V.B.1. 
127 WISEMAN & TOBIN, supra note 72, at 43 (emphasis added).  In fact, it is the rarest of 
cases where probable cause is found not to exist in the Fourth Amendment contexts.  See, 
e.g., State v. Garrett, Nos. 2008AP437-CR & 2008AP438-CR, 773 N.W.2d 225, 2009 WL 
2180899, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2009) (reversing trial court’s finding of reasonable 
suspicion for investigatory stop where perpetrator was described as a “tall, thin, black male 
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words, the reality is that a double standard has been created.  Whether 
probable cause is found to exist no longer depends on the facts, but rather 
on whether the defendant is asking the court to suppress show-up 
evidence—in which case probable cause will be found not to exist—or to 
suppress physical evidence—in which case probable cause will be found to 
exist. 
VI. SOLVING THE PROBLEM 
The minority approach to show-ups is a vast improvement over the 
majority approach.  Further, the minority approach is not an incremental, 
evolutionary change, as is the approach in states that still embrace the 
factor-laden framework of the majority rule.  Instead, the minority approach 
is a revolutionary reform rooted in the scientific evidence regarding show-
ups, false identifications, and wrongful convictions.128  However, as this 
Article illustrates, even the best reform is of little value if the police and the 
courts are permitted to distort and circumvent the law. 
Consequently, based on the analysis in Part V, the Supreme Court 
should adopt the minority rule,129 but with the following, additional 
reforms.  First, the test for the exigency exception to the minority rule must 
be whether the exigency prevents the use of a lineup or photo array, not 
whether exigency exists for Fourth Amendment purposes.130  Second, with 
this proper definition of exigency in mind, the term cannot be degraded to 
the point where it becomes synonymous with the concept of police 
convenience.131 
Third, when determining whether the probable cause exception is 
satisfied—that is, whether the police lacked probable cause to arrest the 
defendant—the reason for the probable cause is irrelevant.  The issue is 
whether the defendant was, or could have been, arrested, regardless of the 
reason.  If so, then the show-up was not necessary, and a lineup or photo 
array should have been conducted.132  Fourth, the determination of probable 
cause must be consistent with existing law on probable cause.  For example, 
 
wearing glasses,” and the defendant was a white male and did not otherwise match the 
description). 
128 See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005) (citing numerous psychological 
and empirical studies in support of its adopting the minority rule on show-ups).  The Dubose 
court also stated that “this case is not the first to result in a change in principles based on 
extensive new studies.”  Id. at 598.  The court then discussed how the Supreme Court used 
similar studies in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to overrule Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  See Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 598. 
129 See supra note 75. 
130 See supra Part V.A.1. 
131 See supra Part V.A.2. 
132 See supra Part V.B.1. 
410 Michael D. Cicchini & Joseph G. Easton [Vol. 100 
if a jurisdiction has previously held that a given set of facts was sufficient 
for probable cause to arrest and search a suspect, then that jurisdiction must 
be bound by that holding.  Consequently, that same set of facts must also 
give rise to probable cause in the context of show-ups, and when those facts 
are present, an arrest must be made and a lineup or photo array must be 
conducted.133 
These reforms address the bulk of what is needed to advance the goal 
and policy of the minority approach.  However, there is still one flaw that is 
inherent in the approach and must be corrected.  We have seen that the 
minority approach works quite well when there is probable cause to arrest a 
suspect.  In that case, a lineup or photo array is not only possible but is 
required.  This creates a much lower risk that an innocent person, despite 
the existence of facts giving rise to probable cause, will be falsely identified 
and wrongfully convicted.134 
However, although the minority approach is superior to the majority 
approach, it still offers little protection when the police completely lack 
probable cause to arrest a suspect.  For example, if there is no indication 
that a person was involved in the crime currently under investigation, and 
there is no other unrelated reason to justify an arrest, then the police are 
actually permitted, under the minority approach, to conduct a show-up of 
that person. 
The paradox is that, with regard to any suspect, the stronger the initial 
evidence of innocence, the more likely a show-up will be permitted and the 
greater the risk of false identification and wrongful conviction.  Consider, 
once again, our hypothetical scenario from Part I, in which a victim was 
robbed at gun point in his apartment, and the perpetrator fled on foot.  
Under these facts, the minority rule creates the counterintuitive result of 
offering stronger due process protection to the suspect who flees upon 
seeing police, or who is carrying a concealed weapon, than it does to the 
completely innocent and unaware bystander who just happens to be in the 
vicinity of the crime. 
This paradox, however, is easily solved.  When police completely lack 
probable cause to arrest a suspect, that suspect should have the right to 
request a lineup or photo array in lieu of a show-up.  First, this is nothing 
more than what the minority approach already affords the suspect for whom 
the police have probable cause to arrest.  Second, such a request would 
constitute a waiver by the suspect of his freedom for the time necessary to 
assemble and conduct the lineup or photo array.  This waiver would, of 
 
133 See supra Part V.B.2. 
134 See supra Part IV.C. 
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course, substitute for probable cause to arrest, and the show-up would no 
longer be necessary.135 
Further, the police must be required to notify the suspect of the risk 
associated with a show-up procedure, as well as the suspect’s right to a 
lineup or photo array procedure.  This is, of course, very similar to the 
process of “informing the accused” when the police suspect a person of 
drunk driving,136 or reading Miranda rights before the police interrogate an 
in-custody suspect.137  The law already requires that police read a suspect 
his rights in these other related contexts.  This demonstrates that the 
administrative burden of informing a suspect of his right to a lineup or 
photo array procedure would be minimal.  Further, it would ensure due 
process protection for all citizens, rather than the counterintuitive approach 
of protecting only those citizens whose actions or appearance have created 
probable cause for their own arrest. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Social science research has shown that eyewitness identification 
testimony in criminal trials has a dual problem: first, it is highly unreliable; 
and second, it is highly persuasive to juries.  This, of course, is a dangerous 
combination, and erroneous eyewitness identifications often lead to 
wrongful convictions of innocent defendants.138  Further, when the 
identification evidence is derived from a show-up procedure—an incredibly 
suggestive and highly unreliable identification procedure—the risk to 
innocent defendants is increased several-fold.139 
However, the risks associated with show-ups begin, but do not end, 
with the risk of wrongfully convicting an innocent defendant.  Additionally, 
the community in general is far less safe due to the use of show-up 
procedures.  When a show-up is conducted and an innocent suspect is 
falsely identified, the police have no way of determining that the 
identification is false.  Therefore, not only is the innocent suspect arrested 
and prosecuted, but the true perpetrator goes free.  This, in turn, allows the 
perpetrator to continue an ongoing crime spree or commit additional, 
 
135 This proposed rule is a modification of a proposal by Jessica Lee, who argued that, 
because the dangers of show-ups are not commonly known, even a defendant’s waiver 
should not operate to allow the use of a show-up, as the waiver could not have been made 
knowingly and intelligently and therefore would be invalid.  See Lee, supra note 1, at 757. 
136 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4) (2006) (requiring that individuals suspected of 
operating while intoxicated be read their rights regarding tests for breath, blood, or urine). 
137 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966). 
138 See supra Part II. 
139 See supra Part III. 
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unrelated crimes.  All of this, of course, threatens the safety of the 
community.140 
Because show-up procedures are incredibly harmful to both innocent 
defendants and society generally, some states have revolutionized their 
approach to show-up evidence and adopted the minority rule.  Under this 
minority rule, show-up evidence may only be used at trial if, at the time of 
the show-up: (1) there existed exigent circumstances that prevented the 
police from conducting a lineup or photo array; or (2) the police lacked 
probable cause to arrest the defendant, again preventing them from 
conducting a lineup or photo array.141 
This minority approach is a tremendous improvement over the old 
majority approach.  Its advantages lie not only in its recognition of the 
social science research but also in its departure from the easily manipulated 
facts-and-circumstances framework of the majority rule.  Nonetheless, even 
where the minority rule has been adopted, some courts have been successful 
in circumventing the rule by distorting its two exceptions: the exigent 
circumstances exception and the probable cause exception. 
The judiciary’s distortion of these rules, however, is easily remedied.  
First, with regard to the exigent circumstances exception, the test must be 
whether the exigency prevented the use of a lineup or photo array, not 
whether exigency existed for Fourth Amendment purposes.142  Additionally, 
the term exigency cannot be degraded to the point where it becomes 
synonymous with the concept of police convenience.143  Second, with 
regard to the probable cause exception, the underlying reasons for the 
probable cause are irrelevant,144 and the determination of whether probable 
cause exists must be consistent with existing law on probable cause.145 
Finally, the one flaw of the minority approach—that is, the complete 
lack of probable cause to arrest a person actually operates to that person’s 
detriment by allowing the police to conduct a show-up—is easily remedied.  
Much like reading rights in the Miranda context, police would be required 
to inform the suspect of the risk of a show-up, as well as his right to 
accompany the police for a less suggestive, and more reliable, identification 
procedure such as a lineup or a photo array.146 
Only these reforms will ensure due process protection for all citizens, 
as intended by the minority rule’s general ban on show-up evidence.  
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Further, the last of these proposed reforms will eliminate the 
counterintuitive approach of protecting only those citizens whose actions or 
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